In diesem Aufsatz geht der Autor der Frage nach, ob und in wiefern die theologische Annahme, daß das Christusgeschehen paradigmatisch für den Begriff des Handeln Gottes ist, verständlich ist. Der Verfasser analysiert dafür die Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung und versucht die christologischen Konsequenzen der verschiedene Interpretationen für die Konstruktion eines Modells des Handeln Gottes herauszufinden. Er benützt Gedanken geschichtsphilosophischer Art um eine solche Ausdehnung der Vorstellung des Christusgeschehens zu verteidigen, daß auch andere Zeiten als das erste Jahrhundert einzuschließen sind. Damit zeigt (...) der Verfasser, daß Lessings Problem des garstigen Grabens und viele Formen der Leben-Jesu-Forschung theologisch von falschen Fragestellungen ausgehen. (shrink)

Epistemic constitutivism (EC) holds that the nature of believing is such that it gives rise to a standard of correctness and that other epistemic normative notions (e.g., reasons for belief) can be explained in terms of this standard. If defensible, this view promises an attractive and unifying account of epistemic normativity. However, EC faces a forceful objection: that constitutive standards of correctness are never enough for generating normative reasons. This paper aims to defend EC in the face of this objection. (...) I do so in two steps. First, I dispute a crucial assumption underlying the case against EC: that constitutive standards of correctness in general are ‘reason-giving’ only if and because there is also a prior reason to comply with them. Second, I outline a strategy of how EC can meet the challenge of explaining what’s special about the activity of believing such that, unlike other standard-governed activities, it is capable of generating normative reasons. (shrink)

In this book, I offer an account of intentional action. The book has two main parts: in the first part, I discuss and criticize the currently prevailing account of intentional action—the Causal Theory of Action (CTA)—and, in the second part, I offer my alternative account. The CTA proposes essentially two conditions for something that you do to be an intentional action: (1) what you do is represented by your intention (or other mental attitudes), and (2) it is caused by your (...) intention. Against the CTA, I argue that, since it conceives of representation and causality as essentially separate conditions, it cannot explain why, when someone acts intentionally, it is not a mere accident that both conditions are jointly satisfied: i.e., that the intention causes the movement it represents. The CTA’s inability to rule out such accidentality is, as I argue further, the deeper source of the notorious problem of deviant causation. Given this diagnosis, I claim that the key for a satisfactory account of intentional action is to conceive of the essential unity of representation and causality in intentional action. Doing so, I suggest, requires understanding a distinctive sort of causality at work in intentional action. Following the work of G.E.M. Anscombe, I argue that what is distinctive of the sort of causal-explanatory connection captured in action explanations like “S is doing A because she intends to do B” is that it is essentially known by the acting subject. In the final sections of the book, I then develop and defend a conception of the sort of self-knowledge involved in intentional action. (shrink)

In acting intentionally, it is no accident that one is doing what one intends to do. In this paper, I ask how to account for this non-accidentality requirement on intentional action. I argue that, for systematic reasons, the currently prevailing view of intentional action – the Causal Theory of Action – is ill-equipped to account for it. I end by proposing an alternative account, according to which an intention is a special kind of cause, one to which it is essential (...) that it represents its effect. (shrink)

Children develop in a real, messy world in which learning unfolds through time and space shared with others. Understanding how children develop in this complex environment will require a solid, theoretically-grounded understanding of how the child and environment interact—both within and beyond the laboratory. We as researchers understand the scientific value in testing children in carefully-controlled environments, but for our findings to have any impact on children’s lives we must strive to understand how the processes we study in the lab (...) operate in the real, busy environments in which children interact with peers and adults. Categories, like children, do not exist in isolation. Consequently, category learning cannot be easily separated from the learning context—nor should it be. According to a systems perspective of cognition and development, categorization emerges as the product of multiple factors combining in time (Thelen & Smith, 1994). Here we illustrate this multicausality by considering the who, what, how, where and when of categorization. In this paper, we include many different types of behaviors under the umbrella term “categorization.” To be as inclusive as possible, we consider any case in which a participant responds to how stimuli may be grouped as evidence of category learning. This includes studies of word learning (generalizing a label from one instance to another), looking preferences (to stimuli from different familiar groups), and play (exclusively touching instances from the same category). The variety of tasks that relate to category learning exemplify the importance of this fundamental process to a broad range of behaviors outside the lab.You may notice in these examples that we have not included children’s ages because, according to a systems view, research should not be about age per se. Our goal is not to create a catalog of milestones; our goal is to understand the cognitive mechanisms driving change. Therefore, we focus on the developmental level of the child. Obviously, age must be taken into account in experimental design because age is generally (but not perfectly) correlated with developmental level (e.g., appropriate motor responses differ for a 2-year-old versus 2-month-old). Our point, however, is that we will learn more about category learning if we stop asking questions such as “how do prototype representations compare between 6 and 8 months of age?” and focus instead on the underlying learning mechanisms, e.g., “what causes prototype representations to change?”Who is Involved in Learning. In the real world children learn through play and independent exploration (Hirsh-Pasek, Golinkoff, Berk, & Singer, 2009). However, in the lab children are seldom alone. This is important because children adjust their learning depending on who is providing information (e.g., the same or different experimenter, Goldenberg & Sandhofer, 2013; human or robot, O'Connell, Poulin-Dubois, Demke, & Guay, 2009; mom or dad, Pancsofar & Vernon-Feagans, 2006). Children are also opportunistic and will look for any signal of what the right answer is. For example, children will track who is present when they hear a new word (e.g., Akhtar, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 1996), whether the speaker has provided reliable information before (e.g., Jaswal & Neely, 2006) and whether a question is repeated (e.g., Samuel & Bryant, 1984). Thus, who is involved in learning matters both for learning in general and for category learning specifically. Moreover, who the child is also matters. For example, children with larger vocabularies more flexibly categorize the same stimuli on multiple dimensions (Ellis & Oakes, 2006; Horst et al., 2009); right-handed participants are more likely to associate “good” with right and “bad” with left (Casasanto & Henetz, 2012); and female participants learn phonologically-familiar novel words better than males (Kaushanskaya, Gross, & Buac, 2013; Kaushanskaya, Marian, & Yoo, 2011).What is Being Categorized. All categories are not created equal: categories vary in complexity and within-category similarity (Sloutsky, 2010). Where children draw boundaries between categories is influenced by category (object) properties, including distinctive features (Hammer & Diesendruck, 2005), number of common features (Horst & Twomey, 2013; Samuelson & Horst, 2007), visual cues to animacy (Jones, Smith, & Landau, 1991), the presence of category labels (Plunkett, Hu, & Cohen, 2008; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004) and the presence of other objects (e.g., identical or non-identical exemplars Kovack-Lesh & Oakes, 2007; Oakes & Ribar, 2005). In naturalistic environments, categories are often ad hoc and flexible (Barsalou, 1983). For example, the category ‘toys to pick up before bed’ may be discussed every day, but each day it may include different items. Furthermore, the process of categorizing objects is not independent of the objects themselves: different objects may be more or less flexibly assigned to different categories depending on the context (Mareschal & Tan, 2007) and information available (Horst et al., 2009). Thus, in order to understand the process of categorization, researchers must ensure that the results they find in the lab are not too closely tied to the specific stimuli. Where Categories are Experienced and Tested. We know that environment matters because there are significant effects of household chaos (Petrill, Pike, Price, & Plomin, 2004), excessive classroom decorations (Fisher, Godwin, & Seltman, 2014) and environmental noise (for a review see, Klatte, Bergström, & Lachmann, 2013) on children’s cognition. Where a child lives impacts what social categories they learn and the category choices they make. For example, Black Xhosa children in South Africa prefer own-race faces if they live in a primarily Black township, but prefer higher-status race faces if they live in a racially diverse city (Shutts, Kinzler, Katz, Tredoux, & Spelke, 2011). Furthermore, where children live interacts with who they are: only infants from the statistically dominant race show “own-race” face preferences; infants from the minority race show no race preference (Bar-Haim, Ziv, Lamy, & Hodes, 2006). In the lab, location matters both in terms of where the child is and where the stimuli are. For example, children are more likely to learn names for nonsolid substances if introduced to the gooey items in a familiar highchair context (Perry, Samuelson, & Burdinie, 2014). Children also benefit when learning and testing contexts are the same (Vlach & Sandhofer, 2011) and when stimuli locations are the stable across naming instances (Samuelson, Smith, Perry, & Spencer, 2011). How and When Category Learning is Probed. Different tasks support different types of category learning. For example, yes/no questions lead to a stronger shape bias than forced-choice questions (Samuelson, Schutte, & Horst, 2009), various types of feedback differentially affect learning categories with highly salient features versus less salient features (Hammer, Sloutsky, & Grill-Spector, 2012) and highly variable category members facilitate category name generalization (Perry, Samuelson, Malloy, & Schiffer, 2010) whereas less variable category members facilitate category name retention (Twomey, Ranson, & Horst, 2014).Categorization does not reflect static knowledge; rather, category learning unfolds over time and is a product of nested timescales. Children (and adults) are constantly learning: experimenters’ distinction between learning versus test trials is arbitrary with respect to the processes that operate within the task (McMurray, Horst, & Samuelson, 2012). That is, learning continues even on test trials—in fact, participants may not realize the shift from learning to test trials. Consequently, different behaviors are observed depending on when during the categorization process category learning is assessed (Horst, Oakes & Madole, 2005). Category learning is a product of nested timescales including (a) the current moment (e.g., how similar the stimuli are on the current trial, Horst & Twomey, 2013), (b) the “just previous” past (e.g., what happens during the intertrial interval, Kovack-Lesh & Oakes, 2007; whether stimuli on the first test trial are novel or familiar, Schöner & Thelen, 2006; and trial order effects Vlach, Sandhofer, & Kornell, 2008; Wilkinson, Ross, & Diamond, 2003) and (c) developmental history (e.g., vocabulary level, Ellis & Oakes, 2006; Horst et al., 2009; Perry & Samuelson, 2011). Because children’s behavior is never solely the product of a single timescale it is impossible to create an experiment that taps only into category learning in the moment or only knowledge children brought to the lab. Each timescales is part of the time-behavior interaction. For example, Kovack-Lesh and colleagues (2008) demonstrated that 4-month-old children’s ability to form a category of cats that excludes dogs is not due only to comparison (i.e., looking back-and-forth, in the moment) or having a pet at home (developmental history), but is due to the interaction of both factors.Unexpected influences. If researchers view categorization as static knowledge, then neither the when or how should matter. Many researchers hold this view, which purports experiments are designed to test what a child knows upon arrival at the lab: trial order and trial types are largely trivial. However, as the examples we provided collectively illustrate, the impact of seemingly “nuisance” factors are not just noise in the data; they are “unexpected influences” that change behavior in predictable ways and can provide insights into the underlying processes of learning and generalization. Small variations in what children experience during category learning can have dramatic impact on how they form categories (e.g., sequential versus simultaneous presentation, Lawson, 2014; Oakes & Ribar, 2005) and differences in testing contexts can lead to indications of what has been learned (Cohen & Marks, 2002). Thus it is vital to acknowledge the impact of such unexpected influences if we want to understand how categorization unfolds over time. Subtle experimental design decisions, such as the number of test trials to include, may not seem theoretically significant, but they can have profound effects on children’s behavior. As dozens of studies illustrate, “boring” factors like counterbalancing and stimuli choice during both learning and testing can have a profound effect on findings, including trial order (Wilkinson et al., 2003), how many targets (Axelsson & Horst, 2013) or competitors (Horst, Scott, & Pollard, 2010) are presented, or the color of the stimuli (Samuelson & Horst, 2007; Samuelson, Perry, & Warrington, 2007). For example, how broadly participants generalize a category label depends on where the exemplars are presented and if the exemplars are visible simultaneously (Spencer, Perone, Smith, & Samuelson, 2011). In particular whether more or less diverse examples occur in the first block of trials influences later generalization (see Spencer et al., 2011 supplementary materials). A result like this sheds light onto the generalization process: deciding how broadly a category should be applied depends on the timing of experience with exemplars (see Oakes & Spalding, 1997; Samuelson & Horst, 2007, for similar findings). Unexpected influences may not be of immediate theoretical interest to a given experimenter, but they are still often informative—even at times vital—to the underlying processes at work (e.g., the influence of novelty on children’s selection is informative for understanding how prior memory influences current learning). Experimental designs should manipulate these types of factors as independent variables whenever possible. We recognize this can be impractical with populations that are costly to recruit, in which case such factors may be controlled for statistically, for example with item-level analyses. Outlook. Category learning unfolds across both space and time, and small differences at one moment (e.g., shared features among the stimuli; whether exemplars are identical) can create a ripple of effects on real behavior. Behavior emerges from the combination of many factors, including those not explicitly manipulated or controlled by the experimenter. To understand what causes developmental changes in behavior, we must also acknowledge and understand the processes through which these factors (sometimes unexpectedly) influence behavior in our tasks, including at short timescales. However, just as it is important to acknowledge these unexpected influences, we must not fail to see the forest for the trees. If a behavior such as category learning can only be captured in an ideal environment under carefully-controlled conditions, how much can we generalize to the contexts in which learning typically occurs? Theoretical accounts that neglect the rich influence of context in real time are too narrow to be applied outside the lab (Simmering & Perone, 2013). What we as researchers are ultimately trying to understand is how learning occurs in a real, cluttered world across time and a variety of contexts. Consequently, a solid, theoretically-grounded understanding of cognitive development will require understanding how the child (or adult) and environment interact. Only then will our theories be both comprehensive enough and sufficiently specific to reliably predict behavior and potentially intervene to prevent adverse outcomes. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE CONCEPT OF PERSON IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS: A Contribution to Recent Discussion* ST. THOMAS AQUINAS accepted and consistently defended Boethius' definition of person: "persona est substantia individua rationalis naturae." St. Thomas' analysis of this definition necessarily involves metaphysical questions because of the implications of the terms " substance" and " nature" and moreover it manifests the inescapahle imprint of the theological problematics which surrounded the issue (e.g. the (...) Trinity and the hypostatic union). Both of these influences, metaphysical and theological, have engendered problems of interpretation and criticism. Contemporary discussions of person largely either continue the scholastic controversies or adopt a modern perspective from which to expose apparent contradictions in St. Thomas' doctrine. The purpose of this article will be limited to a consideration of the metaphysical problems concerning the relationship between individual substance, universal, nature, and existence. It is hoped that such a clarification will resolve not only the neoscholastic controversies, but also some of the contemporary problems. I. BOETHIUS' DEFINITION OF PERSON AND ST. THOMAS' EXPLANATION A. BOETHIUS' DEFINITION Boethius develops his definition of person in the Liber contra Eutychen et N estorium after a careful consideration of na- * I have to thank cordially Father Brian Shanley, 0.P. for having revised completely this English version, devoting much time and energy to fit the text and the footnotes to the style of The Thomist. He adapted the version in good style and verified the Latin quotations. 435 436 HORST SEIDL ture and substance.1 In the first chapter he sets out to define nature and discovers four possible meanings. The first and broadest definition, embracing both substances and accidents, describes nature as belonging to all things which by their being can be in some way or another be comprehended by reason: "natura est earum rermn quae, cum sint, quoquo modo intellectu capi possunt." A second definition, comprising substances alone both corporeal and incorporeal, describes nature as anything that can effect or suffer something: " natura est vel quod facere vel quod pati possit." A third sense, taken from the Aristotelian analysis of the motion of natural substances, describes nature as the immanent principle of movement : "natura est motus principium per se et non per accidens." Finally, nature can also refer to the formal cause which provides the specific difference: " natura est unam quamque rem informans specifica differentia" (cf. ST Ia. 29, I ad 4). It is this last sense which is most important. In sum, "nature" is a broad term encompassing both composite beings and their causes. Boethius continues in chapter two by first narrowing the relevant sense of nature to substances (thus excluding accidents ) and then presenting a complete division of substances. The major distinction is between corporeal substances and incorporeal substances. Corporeal subdivides further into inanimate and animate, with animate dividing. into insensitive and sensitive and the latter dividing finally into irrational and rational. Incorporeal subdivides into rational and irrational (the life-principle of animals), with rational incorporeal substances being further distinguished into those that are immutable by nature (the Creator) and those that are not so by nature (the human soul and angels) but may become so by virtue of the immutable substance. Boethius then argues that person cannot be affirmed of inanimate beings or irrational animals. A 1 All citations from Boethius are taken from the Loeb text in Boethius: Theological Tractates and the Consolation of Philosophy, ed. H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918). THE CONCEPT OF PERSON IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 437 final distinction of :substance into universal and particular leads to the conclusion that person must refer to an individual. Thus the background is set for the definition of person which opens the third chapter: " naturae rationalis individua substantia." Person must be an individual substance of a certain nature, namely rational, which nature accounts for the form or specific difference of the particular substance (the fourth meaning of chapter 1). The connection of this definition with Aristotle 's definition of man as a rational animal is unmistakable. It should also be noted that this definition of person is applicable not only to man, in whom the rational nature is not identical with his substance, but also to the... (shrink)

This is a review of a book that tries to re-establish mind-body dualism by using (a) empirical research on near-death experiences, placebo effects, creativity, claiming even that parapsychology should become a respected part of science, and (b) Frederic W. H. Myers' (1843-1901) metaphor of the brain as a kind of receiving device that records what the irreducible mind sends as messages. Among other things, we criticize the lack of philosophical clarity about mind-body relation, and question the book's tendency to refer (...) to past and current parapsychological literature as reliable. (shrink)

English summary: The relationship of art to physical violence in European cultural history has always been intricate. Aestheticised violence in the fine arts, on the stage or in literature has often been discredited, but at the same time - not least because of the contiguity of violence and sexuality - it is received with pleasure. In a survey of literary examples from antiquity, the Renaissance and modernity, the author begins by elucidating the development in Europe of the troubled relationship between (...) aesthetics and violence. This relationship is then examined from a psychoanaltical angle in two exemplary studies of music. The dual perspective continues with the analyses of contemporary cultural producers (a theatre director, a photographic artist and a film director) together with those of cultural scientists (from theatre studies, art history, and film and media studies). In this way, the actual process of aesthetisizing violence, on the one hand, and theoretical reflections on it, on the other, become clear.German description: Das Verhaltnis der Kunste zur physischen Gewalt ist in der europaischen Kulturgeschichte immer schon ein intrikates gewesen. Asthetisierte Gewalt in der Kunst, auf der Buhne oder in der Literatur wurde zwar oft diskreditiert, zugleich aber - auch wegen der Nahe von Gewalt und Sexualitat - mit Genuss rezipiert. An den Beispielen der Literatur der Antike, der Renaissance und der Moderne zeigt der Band die europaische Entwicklung des ambivalenten Verhaltnisses von Asthetik und Gewalt auf. Aus psychoanalytischer, kulturwissenschaftlicher und medienwissenschaftlicher Perspektive verdeutlichen die Beitrager sowohl konkrete Verfahren des Asthetisierens von Gewalt als auch ihre theoretische Reflexion. Erganzt durch Analysen aus dem Kulturbetrieb - u.a. von Daniel Rademacher, Wilfred H.G. Neuse und Thomas Sieben - bietet der Band so einen umfassenden Einblick in die Beziehung zwischen Kunst und Gewalt. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that in order to understand intentional action we have to understand a distinctive kind of practical knowledge - knowledge that is the cause of what it represents. To do so, I begin by identifying two requirements for an adequate understanding of intentional action: (a) someone who acts intentionally has an intention that is the cause of her action; (b) someone who acts intentionally knows what she is doing. My aim is to show that a theory (...) of intentional action that adequately accounts for both requirements will have to be a theory of practical knowledge. Moreover, I argue that a widespread view of practical thought (e. g. intention) stands in the way of a proper account of the relevant notion of practical knowledge. According to this view, a practical thought is composed of two independent elements: a causal force and a content. I end by sketching an alternative view of practical thought, which, I claim, provides a better framework for understanding practical knowledge. (shrink)

The New Semantics (NS) introduced by Kripke and Putnam is often thought to block antiphysicalist arguments that involve an inference from an explanatory gap to a failure of supervenience. But this “NS Rebuttal” depends upon two assumptions that are shown to be dubious. First, it assumes that mental-kind terms are among the kinds of terms to which NS analysis is properly applied. However, there are important differences in this regard between the behavior of notions like ‘pain’ and notions like ‘water’, (...) as Kripke himself has argued. Second, even on the assumption that NS analysis is appropriate to mental-kind terms, it is further assumed that this would block the anti-physicalist premise that an abiding and principled explanatory gap would entail a failure of metaphysical supervenience. But the paradigm examples of NS analysis show nothing of the sort. What they show is that there are a posteriori necessities (e.g., “water contains hydrogen”) that cannot be inferred from the sense of natural kind terms. But they do not show that such necessities cannot be derived from an adequate scientific understanding of the phenomena in question. Indeed, such derivations are often available with kinds like water, but seem unavailable with mental kinds like ‘pain’ and ‘belief’. (shrink)

Objectives:Social isolation is increasing in aging societies and several studies have shown a relation with worse cognition in old age. However, less is known about the association in the oldest-old (85+); the group that is at highest risk for both social isolation and dementia. Methods:Analyses were based on follow-up 5 to 9 of the longitudinal German study on aging, cognition, and dementia in primary care patients (AgeCoDe) and the study on needs, health service use, costs, and health-related quality of life (...) in a large sample of oldest-old primary care patients (AgeQualiDe), a multi-center population-based prospective cohort study. Measurements included the Lubben Social Network Scale (LSNS-6), with a score below 12 indicating social isolation, as well as the Mini-Mental Status Examination (MMSE) as an indicator of cognitive function. Results:Dementia-free study participants (n = 942) were M = 86.4 (SD = 3.0) years old at observation onset, 68.2% were women. One third (32.3%) of them were socially isolated. Adjusted linear hybrid mixed effects models revealed significantly lower cognitive function in individuals with smaller social networks (β = 0.5, 95% CI = 0.3-0.7, p <.001). Moreover, changes in an individual's social network size were significantly associated with cognitive changes over time (β = 0.2, 95% CI = 0.1-0.4, p =.003), indicating worse cognitive function with shrinking social networks. Conclusion:Social isolation is highly prevalent among oldest-old individuals, being a risk factor for decreases in cognitive function. Consequently, it is important to maintain a socially active lifestyle into very old age. Likewise, this calls for effective ways to prevent social isolation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:134 When the woman saw that the fruit of the tree was good for food and pleasing to the eye, and also desirable for gaining wisdom, she took some and ate it —­Genesis 3:6 Abstract Aesthetics has emerged as an important battleground in the moral quest for a lower carbon society. Especially in the case of proposed wind farms (an environmentally benign technology in terms of low carbon emissions), (...) opponents frequently refer to the unsightly machines creating negative landscape impacts and ruining the view. This essay seeks to reflect on the particular ways in which visual aesthetics are framed and mobilized in this moral debate. Exploring the dividing lines between pictoral and more-­ than-­ representational approaches I ask if the moral dilemmas in our landscape decisions (e.g. individual rights to beauty or collective duties toward future generations) are obscured by physical or visual realms. The largely invisible nature of wind, electricity and climate change, set within the physical and tangible nature of landscapes and turbines, challenges us to experience the aesthetics of landscapes-­ with-­ machines through more creative and engaging means that are not limited to visibility, nor deaf to morality. SIN, DUTY, AND THE AESTHETICS OF NATURE As the first act of sin in the bible, Eve’s consumption of a visually aesthetic fruit led to humans being banned from the Garden of Eden. Looking at the above sentence more closely, we could even argue that “good for food” is not a positive condition (e.g. tasty, nourishing), but Justice in the Eye of the Beholder? ‘Looking’ Beyond the Visual Aesthetics of Wind Machines in a Post-­Productivist Landscape DAN VAN DER HORST Dan van der Horst / Justice in the Eye of the Beholder? 135 rather the absence of a negative (e.g. inedible), whilst “also desirable” may sound like the hunger for wisdom was only a secondary, additional attraction. The sentence thus draws attention to the key role of aesthetics in the making of a moral decision; would Eve have eaten the forbidden fruit if it was not “pleasing for the eye”? Aesthetic judgments may be informed by a range of factors, but as this bible quote illustrates, morality is key among them. Associations between right and wrong on the one side and beauty or ugliness on the other, are not exactly rare in written history, be they religious, literary or scholastic works. As a marked contribution to the latter, Immanuel Kant has paid particularly close attention to the links between aesthetics and morality, arguing amongst others that any universal agreement in judgments of the sublime must rest on an appeal to moral feelings.1 But universality is not the only logical link between aesthetic judgementandmorality.Peoplecanfeelasenseof‘duty’tofindcertainthings beautiful e.g. because that is the aesthetic judgment of the group they aspire to belong to.2 Whilst this sense of duty can refer to social conditioning and group belonging, it also has resonance for landscape aesthetics at a time of anthropogenic climate change (a universal threat) when we must “learn to love the low carbon landscape.”3 This presents a point of departure from the debate on the moral obligation of preserving aesthetically pleasing landscapes (as we tend to do through legal designations, e.g. national parks), an ethical logic which leads, to use the words of Holmes Rolston, “from beauty to duty.”4 Moreover a posi­ tive aesthetical appreciation of a landscape because it accommodates low carbon technologies, would potentially require an inverse ethical logic, i.e. from duty to beauty.5 Notwithstanding the clear conceptual links between moral and aesthetic judgment, in everyday life it may be far less clear what kind of moral issues may underpin particular expressions of aesthetic sensibility. This can be particularly problematic for the deployment of environmental technologies (i.e. technologies pursued to reduce pollution ) that have significant landscape footprints. That is where we can find universal moral claims demanding environmental action for the common good rubbing up against aesthetic landscape judgments in places where such developments are proposed. This produces an unsatisfactory situation in which the deployment of clean technologies ENVIRONMENT, SPACE, PLACE / VOLUME 10 / ISSUE 1 / 2018 136 is delayed, tensions within local communities may increase... (shrink)

Literature on media ethics often tries to close the gap between theory and professional practice. So do three new books by T. Harcup, K. Sanders, and S. L. Bracci and C. G. Christians, of which only Sanders stably positions herself on both sides. She offers outlines of moral philosophical positions where she favors the virtue ethics approach that deals with a person's character and moral abilities. At the same time Sanders analyzes typical conflicts that arise in the everyday work of (...) journalists. Sanders and the more practical oriented former journalist Harcup follow the same fundamental question: "What is journalism for?", but they give different answers. To Harcup, the basic task of journalism lies in the effort to create publicness, i. e., to override barriers of social communication. To Sanders, journalism exists just to tell the truth. Much can be learned from the ‘theorists for contemporary ethics’, such as Charles Taylor and Jurgen Habermas, who are presented and interpreted in Bracci and Christian's collection, about the relationship between truth and publicness and how this relationship might stimulate the practice of journalism. Journalists' consideration of truth cannot be the necessary prerequisite for the publication of information; instead, the freedom of discourse is the necessary precondition to ensure that the decision whether and to what extent an information is of public interest remains in the hands of the public itself. (shrink)

From Einstein's point of view, his General Relativity Theory had strengths as well as failings. For him, its shortcoming mainly was that it did not unify gravitation and electromagnetism and did not provide solutions to field equations which can be interpreted as particle models with discrete mass and charge spectra, As a consequence, General Relativity did (and does) not solve the quantum problem, either. Einstein tried to get rid of the shortcomings without losing the achievements of General Relativity Theory. Stimulated (...) by papers of Weyl (Sitzungsber. Preuss. Akad. Wiss (1918) 465) and Eddington (Proc. R. Soc. Hond. 99 (1921) 194), from 1923 onward, he believed that, to reach this goal, one has to transit to space–times which possess more comprehensive geometrical structures than the Riemann space–time. This was the beginning of a decade's lasting search for a unitary field theory. We describe this exciting part of the history of physics, discuss achievements and failures of this development, and ask how these early attempts of a unified theory strike us today. Taking into account the fact that the Equivalence Principle only speaks for a geometrization of gravitation, we consider an alternative way to give those non-Riemannian structures which were introduced by the unitary field approach a physical meaning, namely the meaning of a generalized gravitational field. This is interesting since there are arguments in favor of such a generalization of General Relativity Theory, e.g., the problems the latter theory meets with if one tries to quantize it and to unify gravitation with other interactions. (shrink)

Die erste Rezeption Kants unmittelbar nach Erscheinen der Kritik der reinen Vernunft zahlt zu den folgenreichsten und spannendsten Etappen der neueren Philosophiegeschichte. Erstaunlicherweise ist sie noch immer weithin unerforscht. Dieser Band geht auf eine Fruhkantianismus-Ausstellung der Universitat Jena (1993) zuruck. Er hilft, das Quellenmaterial leichter zu erschliessen. Kapitel uber Ch. G. Schutz, C. Ch. E. Schmid, die Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, Reinhold, Schiller, Hufeland u.a. geben neue Einblicke in diese fruhe Etappe der Kantrezeption. An die hundert Abbildungen prasentieren teilweise vollig unbekanntes Quellenmaterial (...) von hohem Wert. The first reception of Kant directly after publication of the Critique of Pure Reason is one of the most momentous and fascinating stages in the recent history of philosophy. Surprisingly not much research has been done on this. This volume is the result of an exhibition of early Kantianism at the University of Jena in 1993. It helps to make the source material more easily accessible. Chapters on Ch. G. Schutz, C. Ch. E. Schmid, the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, Reinhold, Schiller, Hufeland among others provide new insight into this early stage of Kant's reception. There are approximately 100 illustrations which present very valuable source material, some of which was previously completely unknown. (shrink)

This paper examines Fechner’s introduction to experimental psychophysics from a phenomenological perspective. Horst’s analysis is used to demonstrate the phenomenology that is inherent to classical perceptual psychophysics. Horst argues that the psychophysical event of perception can only be understood as an intentional intertwining of subject and object. From this we move to physiological component of psychophysics—that is, the processes that mediate perceptual awareness. Drawing primarily on the work of Rosen, it is argued the phenomenology provides the most appropriate (...) approach for what could be understood as a contemporary psychophysics—one that borrows from recent trends in physics, neuro-physiology, and perception as classical psychophysics had done. This results in a psychiatric neurophenomenology. Examples of the placebo effect and treatment of traumatic brain injury are used to demonstrate the usefulness of a phenomenological psychophysics, one that ultimately meets the demands of Fechner’s original proposal. (shrink)

Horst Dietrich Preuss, Old Testament TheologyRolf P. Knierim, The Task of Old Testament Theology: Essays, Substance, Method and CasesDaniel Patte, Ethics of Biblical Interpretation: A Re‐evaluationBrian D. Ingraffia, Postmodern Theory and Biblical Theology: Vanquishing God's ShadowJohn Barclay and John Sweet, Early Christian Thought in its Jewish ContextStephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall and Gerald O'Collins, The Resurrection: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Resurrection of JesusMaureen A. Tilley, Donatist Martyr Stories: The Church in Conflict in Roman North AfricaMaureen A. Tilley, The (...) Bible in Christian North Africa: The Donatist WorldL. G. Patterson, Methodius of Olympus: Divine Sovereignty, Human Freedom and Life in ChristJ. H. D. Scourfield, Consoling Heliodorus: A Commentary on Jerome, Letter 60C. Moreschini and D. A. Sykes, St Gregory of Nazianzus: Poemata ArcanaPeter O'Dwyer, Towards a History of Irish SpiritualityUinseann Ó Maid'n, The Celtic Monk: Rules and Writings of Early Irish MonksDáibhíÓ Cróinín, Early Medieval Ireland 400–1200Gerhard Ladner, God, Cosmos, Humankind: The World of Early Christian SymbolismKevin Trainor, Relics, Ritual and Representation in Buddhism: Rematerializing the Sri Lankan Theravãda TraditionSteven F. Ostrow, Art and Spirituality in Counter‐Reformation Rome: The Sistine and Pauline Chapels in S. Maria MaggioreDavid Morgan, Visual Piety: A History and Theory of Popular Religious ImagesColleen McDannell, Material Christianity: Religion and Popular Culture in AmericaSarah Coakley, Religion and the BodyPaul F. Bradshaw and Lawrence A. Hoffman, Life Cycles in Jewish and Christian WorshipGordon P. Jeanes, The Day Has Come! Easter and Baptism in Zeno of VeronaJohn Macquarrie, A Guide to the SacramentsMegan McKenna, Rites of Justice: The Sacraments and Liturgy as Ethical ImperativesDouglas J. Davies, Death, Ritual and Belief. (shrink)

Theology as a confessional discipline is challenged to prove its academic character. Only the distanced view to religion, as it is significant for non-confessional religious studies, seems to be in a position to deal with the cultural phenomenon called ‘religion’ in a serious academic manner. Theology should to live up to the challenge by proposing itselfs specific concept of ‘religion’. It is in this field, that we find the topic of an fruitful and dialectical encounter between both disciplines, theology and (...) religious studies. On the one hand, theories of religion, as they arose in the context of modern protestantism, can show, that ‘religion’ embodies the concept, by which this confessional tradition transcends its own particularity towards the universality of the human. On the other hand, modern religous studies have evidenced, that we have ‘religion’ only in the particular diversity of practised religions. Against this background, the paper argues for a specific protestant concept of religion, which works out the dialectic between particularity and universality in terms of the relation of the divine absolute and the human individual – focussing on the transparent constitution of the freedom of individuals. The paper concludes with reflections on a concept of modern culture, which allows for realisation of this freedom. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that Barth resists the modern “turn to the subject” and that important features of his approach can be explained as being motivated by this resistance. Under the parameters of this “turn”, the human subject occupies a position which should be reserved for God. As an antidote to this turn, Barth suggests an exchange of subjects: The role that the subject occupies under subjectivist parameters should be taken over by a Trinitarian notion of God. This suggestion (...) explains to a great extent the approach he takes since his famous “breakthrough” and explains also his harsh rejection of Brunner. (shrink)

One goal of the HEALthy Brain and Child Development (HBCD) study is to oversample pregnant women who use substances, beyond predefined thresholds, to enable research on the effects of prenatal opio...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Controversy Between Schelling and Jacobi LEWIS S. FORD SCHELLING, ALONGWITH FICHTE, has suffered the fate of being labelled one of tIegel's predecessors. Richard Kroner provides the classic expression of this viewpoint in his monumental study, Von Kant bis Hegel, which examines Schelling's thought primarily for its contribution to Hegel's final synthesis.I In English we have Josiah Royce's sympathetic and lively account of Schelling's early romantic exuberance, regarded as (...) a transitional stage in the development of German idealism. 2 But this emphasis on the early ScheUing has led to an unfortunate neglect of his work subsequent to the break with Hegel in 1807. Schelling's romanticism, so ably documented by E. D. Hirsch, Jr., 3 can only be regarded as one phase in the total sweep of his thought, for, after the break with Hegel, Schelling produced at least three major works: the essay •ber das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit,4 wrestling with the problem of evil and human freedom, the fragmentary Weltalter, 5 which in scope and dialectical intricacy should be compared with Hegel's Logic, and the Philosophie der Mythologie und Offenbarung, 6 furnishing a fundamental critique of the whole dialectical enterprise. Save for the essay on human freedom, however, none of these works were published during his lifetinm, as Schelling withdrew from the public eye after his controversies with Hegel and Jacobi. Thus the publishing histories of Schelling and Hegel are exactly reverse. Schelling rushed into print his early speculative gropings, while Hegel suppressed his/making the Ph~nomenologic des Geistes his first major publication. Then while Hegel's Logic and Encyclopedia were being publicly acclaimed, Schelling remained silent. This accident of history is largely responsible for the illusion that Schelling is the older of the two x (Tiibingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1921-24),2 vols. 2The Spirit of Modern Philosophy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1892), Lecture VI, 164-189. Wordsworth and ScheUing, A Typological Study of Romanticism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960),Yale Studies in English, Vol. CXLV. 4Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph yon Sehelling, Philosophische Untersuchungen i~berdas Wesen der menschlichen Freyheit und die damit zusaramenhdngenden Gegenstdnde, 1809. Reprinted in the Sdmmtliche Werke, Erste Abtheilung, VII. Band (Stuttgart und Augsburg: J. G. Cotta, 1856), 331-416. English translation by James Gutmann: Of Human Freedom (Chicago: Open Court, 1936). 5Three fragmentary versions of the Weltalter have been published. The Urfassungen of 1811 and 1813were edited by Manfrcd SehrSter and published as a separate Naehlassband to the M~nchener Jubildumsausgabe of the collected works: Die Weltalter, Fragmente (Munich: Biederstein, Leibniz, 1946). A later version is published in S.W. I: 8, pp. 195-344,which has been translated by Frederick de Wolfe Bolman, Jr. : The Ages of the World (NewYork: Columbia University Press, 1942). 6Philosophie der Mythologie is published in S.W. II: 1-2; Philosophie der Offenbarung in S.W. II: 3-4. These essays were first collected and published by Herman Nohl in Hegels theologische Jugendschriften (Tiibingen: 1907).T. M. Knox translated them into English, with an introduction by Richard Kroner: GeorgWilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Early Theological Writings (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948). [75] 76 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY thinkers (actually he was five years Hegel's junior), who retired from the philosophical scene after making his contribution to the Hegelian synthesis. Paul Tillich's doctoral dissertations s and Ernst Cassirer's studies in post-Kantian thought 9 made serious inroads on this conception, yet the iIInsion persisted. Their insistence on the importance of the later Schelling has been brilliantly sustained by two recent studies: Horst Fuhrmans's Schellings Philosophie der Weltalter1~and Walter Schulz's Die Vollendung des deutschen Idealismus in der Spdtphilosophie Schellings, ~ and we may hope that the conventional estimate of Schelling will be drastically revised. Fuhrmans has demonstrated that the split between the early and the later Schelling must be placed in the year 1806 when he came in contact with Franz yon Bander in Munich, who encouraged him to delve deeper into the theological and cosmological ramifications of Jacob Boehme's thought. TM The reorientation this caused is apparent in the essay on human freedom, published in 1809, but it was not fully exploited until the... (shrink)

In order to make sense of the “blooming, buzzing, confusion” of a world where no two objects or events are ever exactly identical, infants form categories of perceptually distinct items that can be treated equivalently. The study of categorization often arises from one of two motivations: 1) to examine the mechanisms by which infants learn to treat distinct objects/events as equivalent (e.g., how an infant comes to name two different animals DOG?) and 2) to examine the current state of an (...) infant’s knowledge (e.g., does an infant have a category of dog). As an illustration, consider Quinn and colleagues’ 1993 study. After habituating to different dog pictures, 3- and 4-month-olds do not dishabituate to cats. However, after habituating to cats, they do dishabituate to dogs. If we were examining the current state of knowledge, what should we conclude? Unless we want to suggest these infants are participants in Schrödinger’s thought experiment (1935)—they both have and do not have a cat category—we cannot say anything conclusive. Instead the results reveal something important about the mechanisms of categorization. Quinn and colleagues (1993) showed variability between category members affects the exclusivity of the categories infants form. This example demonstrates that studying whether infants have a category misses the crucial point that categories are neither things that people have in their heads nor that exist in the world; but rather categorization is a process (see also Oakes & Madole, 2000; Samuelson & Smith, 2000; Samuelson, Perry, & Warrington, 2007). In addition to these two main motivations, the study of categorization typically utilizes one of two methodologies: 1) looking measures, e.g., habituation and preferential looking, and 2) touching/reaching measures, e.g., sequential touching or manual forced choice measures. What I will argue in this paper is that looking measures 1) too readily lend themselves to interpretations of infants having a category or not, and 2) miss the importance the body and physical context have on development.A temptation of looking Too often the focus of looking measures is the outcome—do infants look longer at one stimulus—without regard for how past experiences and the present context influence infants’ looking (but see, Perone & Spencer, 2013). Interpretations that infants do or do not have a category have proven to be particularly tempting in studies examining infants’ categorization of physical events (see also Haith, 1998). For example, evidence that 3-4-month-old infants habituated to a ball rolling behind an occluder dishabituate to an impossible event—a ball rolling behind an occluder and not stopping at a barrier—has been interpreted as evidence for infants having knowledge of physical laws of solidity (Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992). However, in experiments employing reaching measures, when a ball rolls behind a panel of doors and stops at a barrier to the right of one of the doors, older children fail to select the correct door, instead perseveratively reaching for the same door regardless of the barrier location (Berthier, DeBlois, Poirier, Novak, & Clifton, 2000). This failure makes it difficult to say whether infants have knowledge of physical laws. However, failure can tell us something more interesting about development (Perry, Smith, & Hockema, 2008; Perry, Samuelson, & Spencer, 2009; Keen, 2003). For example, Perry and colleagues (2009) demonstrated changes in children’s ability to align their body and movements with relevant spatial reference frames support search accuracy. When 2-year-olds underwent training with the barrier in a fixed position while the ramp moved, such that the correct door was aligned with midline, they correctly located the object during the standard testing procedure. The context of children’s environment—where their bodies are relative to objects and events in the world—influences where they attend and subsequently remember. Such findings demonstrate that the context of learning is critical to understanding developmental change—findings that would not have been made through looking measures. This realization can be applied to the study of categorization. The widespread use of habituation beginning in the 1980s means that much of our knowledge about infants’ categorization comes from their visual exploration of (often) static images (or occasionally visual stimuli in the context of auditory stimuli). Looking measures offer advantages over touching/reaching measures. They can be used with young infants with poor motor control; and computer displays allow increased precision in stimuli construction and presentation. The ability to conduct experiments with a variety of age groups and with high precision has benefited the study of many developmental phenomena, including categorization. However, looking methods can only tell us about categorization of visual or auditory stimuli. A growing body of evidence suggests that word learning and categorization are often closely tied to other perceptual and sensori-motor aspects of the learning context (see e.g., Perry, Samuelson, & Burdinie, 2014; Samuelson, Smith, Perry, & Spencer, 2011). Additionally, the particular task used to measure categorization matters. For example, researchers investigating basic and superordinate-level categorization discovered infants generally form broader categories (corresponding to adult-defined superordinate-level categories such as animal and vehicle) during touching tasks (see e.g., Mandler & Bauer, 1988; Mandler, Bauer, & McDonough, 1991; Mandler & McDonough, 1993; and see Mandler, 2000 for review) and narrower categories (corresponding to adult-defined basic-level categories such as horse and zebra) during looking tasks (see, e.g., Roberts & Cuff, 1989; Behl-Chadha, 1996; and see Mandler, 2000 for review). Thus, relying solely on looking measures therefore provides an incomplete picture of categorization. Next, I discuss evidence from one particular type of categorization—novel noun generalization—that illustrates an essential role for manual actions in learning. Novel noun generalization: a test case for touchingChildren develop word-learning biases that help them generalize novel names to novel objects. By 2-years-old, children typically generalize names of novel solid objects by similarity in shape (shape bias). By 4-years-old, they typically generalize names of novel nonsolid substances by material (material bias). Researchers debate what generalization by shape or material similarity says about the role of perceptual and conceptual information in children’s category learning (see Samuelson & Bloom, 2008). The attentional learning account proposes biases emerge out of associations between perceptual and linguistic regularities (e.g., Samuelson & Smith, 1999; Yoshida & Smith, 2005; Perry & Samuelson, 2011). On the other hand, knowledge-based accounts argue biases are driven not by lower-level regularities but higher-level knowledge about, e.g., functions and core properties (Hammer & Diesendruck, 2005; Kemler Nelson & 11 Swarthmore College Students, 1995). Importantly, both accounts recognize the effects of context in categorization. For example, children’s tendency to demonstrate the shape bias (Hammer & Diesendruck, 2005) and the material bias (Samuelson & Horst, 2007) varies with the specific stimuli and task used. Context-dependency is not a problem of a task that needs to be removed, however, but a fact of categorization. Categorization is not static, but emerges as prior knowledge is brought to bear in a given context (see e.g., Samuelson et al., 2007). Converging evidence supporting this view also suggests an important role for manual action in categorization. Smith (2005) found that the actions children performed on an object influenced how they generalized its name. When two-year-olds were told a novel object was a “wug” and taught to move it up and down, they generalized the name to an object elongated on the vertical axis rather than one elongated on the horizontal axis. Critically, the child had perform the actions, as children in a condition who watched the experimenter perform the action did not systematically select objects elongated consistent with the movement (Smith, 2005). By examining children’s manual interactions with real, physical objects, these results demonstrate that the actions children perform with objects determine what information they use for categorization. Similarly, Perry and colleagues (2014) found that children’s understanding of nonsolid substances (e.g., pudding) is influenced by context-dependent actions. At home, toddlers primarily learn about nonsolids during mealtimes, when they sit in a highchair and can touch and eat nonsolid foods. When 16-months-olds sat in a highchair in the laboratory, they were more likely to messily touch novel substances than those seated at a table. The messier children were, the more likely they were to generalize names of novel nonsolid substances by material. The highchair is a cue to a context-dependent action pattern supporting attention to material. Critically, children who did not touch the substances failed to generalize novel names by material, suggesting looking is not enough. We would miss important discoveries if we only used looking measures to study children’s novel noun generalization. What the touching method afforded was the ability to see how children learn about material. Together these studies reveal context is not a factor to eliminate from experiments, but instead an inseparable part of categorization. Responses in these studies were measured via touching (which object/substance did the child hand to the experimenter). Nevertheless, contrasting touching (or amount of touching in Perry et al.’s study) with looking during learning revealed children’s manual actions determine the information they use to generalize. Moreover, by showing how critical actions are to learning, these studies provide evidence for the usefulness of employing touching measures in studying categorization.Why touching mattersMandler (2000) proposed an important difference between looking- and touching-based tasks: infants are more interested in and more actively explore objects than static images. Infants develop and explore within a world full of rich multimodal information. Indeed, even adults’ perception of familiar objects is influenced by manual exploration (Lederman & Klatzky, 1990; E. Yee, Chrysikou, Hoffman, & Thompson-Schill, 2013). Embodied cognition theorists posit exploration and the multimodal nature of experiences are critical to development (Smith & Gasser, 2005; Thelen & Smith, 1994). Redundant information across modalities (e.g., visual, haptic) facilitates learning of more abstract information (see Bahrick, Lickliter, & Flom, 2004). Cross-modal redundancy is especially useful for understanding shape and material. As an infant explores a toy, haptic information is integrated with visual information. Over development, exploration changes representation of that toy’s shape, and objects’ shapes in general (e.g., Soska, Adolph, & Johnson, 2010). The ability to recognize an object by its shape, is a critical precursor to developing a shape bias (M. Yee, Jones, & Smith, 2012). As infants explore nonsolids, there is similarly redundant sensory information. Nonsolid substances are particularly difficult to recognize by vision alone (cf Adelson, 2001)—e.g., visual similarity between milk and glue is high, while haptic similarity is low. Over development, exploration increases infants’ ability to learn subtle visual cues associated with different materials—critical for categorization of nonsolids (see also, Perry et al., 2014).Given how important multimodal interactions are to development, we as a field cannot rely on looking measures at the expense of what can be learned studying categorization in the context of real objects. Looking measures focusing only on learning outcomes cannot reveal the processes driving categorization. Nevertheless, looking measures have a place in the study of categorization. As critical as touching is to infants’ development, not every question is a touching question. Studies examining where infants look during learning have provided important insights into what infants glean from a given context and subsequent effects on object perception (Johnson, Slemmer, & Amso, 2004) and categorization (Best, Yim, & Sloutsky, 2013). Studying looking as an exploratory process and not just an index of cognition—whether using eye-tracking or traditional habituation—will be a fruitful complement to studies of manual exploration.ConclusionsCategorization is a critical process by which we make sense of the world. Importantly, when children learn about individual categories, they are also learning higher-order regularities between categories, changing the way they learn categories in the future (e.g., Perry, Samuelson, Malloy, & Schiffer, 2010). Thus, studying children’s categorization is valuable in understanding how knowledge and learning change over time. Given that knowledge is dynamically constructed with information from multiple senses, inseparable from context, and children are developing within a world where they are engaging these senses, we miss something important if we only study categorization using looking measures. As a field, we cannot ignore the richness of children’s everyday actions and experiences; therefore, we must engage a variety of methodologies to understand development and the categorization process. (shrink)

1996 : David M. Lee, Douglas D. Osheroff and Robert C. Richardson -- 1997 : Steven Chu, Claude N. Cohen-Tannoudji and William D. Phillips -- 1998 : Robert D. Laughlin, Horst L. Störmer and Daniel C. Tsui -- 1999 : Gerardus 't Hooft and Martinus J.G. Veltman -- 2000 : Zhores I. Alferov, Herbert Kroemer and Jack S. Kilby.

It was the general practice until not at all long ago to look at Turner as one of the moderns, if not as one of the founding fathers of modern art. He was a man straddling the fence between two periods, but he was looking forward. In a history of art that marches through time, forever endorsing what is about to be forgotten, wrapping up, as it were, one style to open eagerly the package of the next, such a position (...) is most enviable for, no matter where the times may be going, it is a hallmark of greatness to be ahead of one's time. There were things to be explained, of course, Turner himself, a keen pessimist, did not approved of the future and had little use for the present.1 His love of art was schooled on Reynolds' Discourses, and he remained loyal to them; his poets were Thomson and Pope and, among contemporaries, the rather frigid but delicate Samuel Rogers, a classicist par excellence. Above all, however, Turner looked back to classical antiquity for training and guidance, and for the delectation of his heart. And the poetry of the ancients, such as he could obtain it in translation, was as important to him as their art. What does one do with a declared classicist whom a historicizing hindsight feels compelled to rescue as a man of the future by making him a Romantic? It is a challenge stylistic analysis likes to meet, for it goes beneath what it declares to be the surface of a work of art to find its style, the essence that must conform to the presumed spirit of the age in question. The triumphant result of such studies in depth is a forgone conclusion as much as it is a surprise to the uninitiated. The facade of the Louvre, for example, used to suffice to make it a building in the classical style; it took the acumen of a Wölfflin to prove that it really was "baroque." The more the artist struggled not to be of his time, the more, poor man, he betrayed to the analyst that he was of his time. The Louvre facade stands convicted of being "classicizing-baroque."2 · 1. On Turner's view of the modern art of his time see John Gage, Color in Turner: Poetry and Truth , pp.97-105. On his literary education and taste see the seminal essay by Jerrold Ziff, "Turner on Poetry and Painting, " Studies in Romanticism 3 no. 4 : 193-215. Turner's poetical writings have been edited by Jack Lindsay, The Sunset Ship: The Poems of J.M.W. Turner . For the most recent and also most elegantly practical introduction to the work and life of Turner, see the catalogue of the Turner Exhibition of the Royal Academy and the Tate Gallery, Turner, 1775-1851 . · 2. This is now a commonplace of art historical teaching. See, for example, Gardner’s Art Through the Ages, 6th ed. Horst de la Croix and Richard G. Tansey , p. 632. On the theory behind the application to the particular case, see Heinrich Wölfflin, Principles of Art History, trans. M. D. Hottinger . Philipp Fehl, artist and art historian, is currently preparing a collection of essays, Art and Morality: Studies in the History of the Classical Tradition. He is a professor in the department of art and design at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. "Farewell to Jokes: The Last Capricci of Giovanni Domenico Tiepolo and the Tradition of Irony in Venetian Painting" was published in Summer 1979 in Critical Inquiry. (shrink)

I dedicate this essay to the memory of the late Wolfgang Mommsen—the subject would have been congenial to him. It is one of a series of offshoots from a central project: a scholarly edition of Max Weber's Protestant Ethic with commentary. When I first told Prof. Mommsen of my plan in 1994 he looked me full in the face and gave a characteristic growl: “All that work!” Here was a man who knew what he was about. My thanks to Ross (...) McKibbin and Keith Tribe for reading this paper in draft. The article begins by examining Max Weber's relations with Lujo Brentano, much the most important “precursor” to Weber in the field of economics. In particular, Brentano conducted a form of parallel inquiry into the rise of ‘the spirit of capital’ in England 35 years before Weber looked for the origins of “spirit” of capitalism there, and the contrast between these two ideas casts much light both on Brentano and on Weber's Protestant Ethic. This personal history leads into a broader history of the transition in German economic thought between the 1860s – the formative decade for Brentano but also the era of Marx's Capital – and that of Weber's generation coming to maturity c.1890. Marx and Weber remain the two great canonical thinkers and original minds; but any authentic historical comparison between Marx and Weber must take in Brentano. The essence of the contrast between the generations is that between Weber's novel conception of an ethical ‘capitalism’, and the materialism and naturalism underpinning Brentano's and Marx's ‘capital’, although Weber and Brentano are alike as liberals, democrats and bourgeois. ☆ Some abbreviations for Weber: AfSS for Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik; GARS for Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie (Tübingen, 1920) vol. i; WL for Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre (Tübingen, 1968); Grundriss for Grundriss zu den Vorlesungen über Allgemeine (“theoretische”) Nationalökonomie [1898], repr. Tübingen, 1990; MWG for Max Weber Gesamtausgabe ed. Horst Baier et al. (Tübingen, 1984); Briefe for letters by Weber in this edition; ‘Nachlaß Max Weber’ for unpublished letters from the Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, VI. HA Nachlaß Max Weber. Lebensbild for Marianne Weber, Max Weber: Ein Lebensbild (Tübingen, 1926); Zohn for idem, Max Weber. A Biography (New Brunswick, 1988) tr. Harry Zohn. For Brentano: Der wirtschaftende Mensch for Der wirtschaftende Mensch in der Geschichte (Leipzig, 1923); Konkrete Grundbedingungen for Konkrete Grundbedingungen der Volkswirtschaft (Leipzig, 1924); Der tätige Mensch for Der tätige Mensch und die Wissenschaft von der Wirtschaft (Marburg, 2006) ed. R. Bräu, H.G. Nutzinger. ‘Die Entwickelung der Wertlehre’ for ‘Die Entwickelung der Wertlehre’, Sitzungsberichte der Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-philologische und historische Klassen. Jahrgang 1908, 3. Abhandlung (15 Feb. 1908), 1–84; ‘Theorie der Bedürfnisse’ for ‘Versuch einer Theorie der Bedürfmisse’, ibid., 10. Abhandlung (5 Dec. 1908), 1–79; ‘Die Malthussche Lehre’ for ‘Die Malthussche Lehre und die Bevölkerungsbewegung der letzten Decennien’ [1909], Abhandlungen der historischen Klasse der Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften XXIV (1906–1909), 565–625, 1*–39*. (shrink)